In his new book, The Crusader: Ronald Reagan and the Fall of Communism, Professor Paul G. Kengor includes the text of a May 14, 1983 memorandum uncovered in the declassified archives of the Soviet Union by Herb Romerstein, a well-known authority on the Venona Papers and the Soviet archives. At least a half dozen independent scholars, all experienced with working in the Soviet archives, have examined the document and have judged it to be authentic.
According to the memorandum, written by Viktor Mikailovich Chebrikov, Chairman of the Committee on State Security of the USSR, the KGB, to Yuri Andropov, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, he was visited by former U.S. Senator John V. Tunney (D-CA) on May 9-10, 1983. Tunney was on a highly sensitive mission for his former University of Virginia law school roommate, a close friend and former senate colleague, Senator Edward Kennedy, (D-MA). The purpose of his mission was to enlist the Kremlin leadership in a grand scheme to defeat Ronald Reagan and other Republicans in the 1984 U.S. elections. .
The meeting would have been held at Lubianka, the frightful headquarters of the KGB, two blocks northeast of Red Square and three blocks from the Kremlin, where it is said that a great many more people have entered the forbidding eight-story structure than have ever come out again.
According to the Chebrikov memorandum, Kennedy was convinced that the chilly relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were due to Reagan’s unwillingness to modify his strategic plan to win a final Cold War victory over the Soviet Union. As Tunney described Kennedy’s frustration with the state of American politics, Reagan was able to rely on the results of Reaganomics -- reduced inflation, reduced taxes, increased worker productivity, expanding business activity, and declining interest rates to support his political standing with the people, making it difficult for Democrats to attack him on foreign policy issues.
As Tunney described Kennedy’s view, the only possible political threat to Reagan was rooted in issues related to war and peace and Soviet-American relations. With the active assistance of the Soviets, these issues would become the most important of the election campaign; hence, the basis for Tunney’s mission to Moscow. As Chebrikov reported, Kennedy believes that, given the current state of affairs, it would be prudent and timely to undertake the following stepsto counter the militaristic Reagan policies:
1. Kennedy asked Andropov to consider inviting him (Kennedy) to Moscow for a personal meeting in July 1983. The primary purpose of the meeting would be to provide Soviet officials with talking points related to problems of nuclear disarmament so that they’d be better prepared and more convincing during appearances in the USA.
2. Kennedy felt that, in order to influence the American people, it would be helpful to have Chairman Andropov submit to a series of television interviews by American TV networks. He felt that a direct appeal by the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the American people would, without doubt, attract a great deal of attention and interest in the country.
Tunney assured Chebrikov that, if the proposal is recognized as worthy, then Kennedy and his political allies would take the necessary steps to have representatives of the major U.S. networks contact Andropov to schedule the interviews. Specifically, he suggested that the head of ABC, Elton Raul, and television columnists Walter Cronkite or Barbara Walters could visit Moscow.
Kennedy also suggested a series of televised interviews, in the U.S., in which members of the Soviet military could convince the American people of the peaceful intentions of the USSR.
Tunney also explained that, since Kennedy had decided not to run for president in 1984, his speeches would be taken without prejudice, as they are not tied to any campaign promises. He indicated that Kennedy wanted to run for president in 1988, and he suggested that, during the 1984 campaign, the Democratic Party may officially turn to him to lead the fight against the Republicans and elect their candidate president.
Tunney left Moscow and returned to the U.S., Chebrikov prepared a memorandum and sent it to Chairman Andropov; and the memorandum found its way into the KGB archives. If additional negotiations took place between Kennedy and the Soviets is not known, but one thing is certain: Ted Kennedy did not expect that Reagan would ultimately win the Cold War, that the Soviet Union would disintegrate, and that Americans would one day find themselves reading of his treachery in documents taken from the archives of the KGB.
The crime of manslaughter would not stick to Ted Kennedy; perhaps the crime of conspiring with foreign leaders to influence a U.S. election will. It’s time to take Teddy Kennedy down, once and for all.
