April 13, 2008 -- New information continues to blast away at last November's
controversial National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the supposed dormant
state of Iran's nuclear weapons program, which the US intelligence community
believes ended in 2003.

This week, Iran announced putting an additional 6,000 centrifuges on-line at
its underground Natanz uranium enrichment plant and opening a new facility
for processing uranium ore into yellowcake, the first step in the uranium
enrichment process.

As is well known, Iran already has 3,000 centrifuges spinning at Natanz,
which - if unchecked - could produce enough fissile material for one nuclear
weapon if running "efficiently" 24/7 for a year.

(Fortunately, from an engineering perspective, experts question how
efficiently the centrifuges are operating, which could slow or inhibit the
production of enriched uranium - the long-pole in the tent of nuclear
weapons development.)

The new uranium ore facility and the trebling of Iran's enrichment capacity
to 9,000 centrifuges means Iran could produce enough highly enriched uranium
for several nuclear weapons in a year's time.

Of course, Tehran has also long made clear it plans to move toward
industrial-scale uranium enrichment, which could include as many as 54,000
centrifuges, providing capacity for a substantive nuclear arsenal.

The United Nations Security Council has called upon Tehran repeatedly to
halt uranium enrichment - which it hasn't - causing Turtle Bay to impose
punitive economic sanctions on Iran no less than three times (the latest in
March) over its "peaceful" nuclear program.

It gets worse . . .

In February, based on intelligence from a number of countries - not just the
United States - the UN's nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), made several startling conclusions about Iran's nuclear
program.

The IAEA intelligence showed that after 2003, Iran was involved in studies
on multipoint detonation systems for nuclear weapons, which are critical for
triggering a chain reaction in a nuclear detonation.

The Vienna-based organization also concluded Tehran had been involved in
work as late as 2004 on the design of a nuclear warhead for the Shahab-class
ballistic missile, which can strike the entire Middle East, including
Israel, and southern Europe, too.

The nuclear agency also asserted that Iran had been involved in undeclared
uranium conversion activities, beyond their declared work at their Isfahan
plant, where they're turning yellow cake into uranium hexafluoride gas for
enrichment at Natanz.

Increasing suspicion, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ordered the
launch of a single-stage ballistic missile described as a "space launch
vehicle," or SLV, from a new space center in northern Iran.

While Iran's space launch program could be relatively benign, such as for
putting communications or scientific satellites into orbit, it could also be
setting the stage for the development of an intercontinental ballistic
missile program.

Theoretically, if you can launch a ballistic missile that can place a
satellite into earth orbit, you have the scientific wherewithal to hit a
target anywhere on Earth with a warhead, including a nuclear weapon.

Not surprisingly, just this month, the US intelligence community began to
walk back its estimate on the state of the Iranian nuclear weapons program
as set forth in the NIE.

Just two weeks ago, CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden noted: "Why would the
Iranians be willing to pay the international tariff [i.e., economic
sanctions] they appear to be willing to pay for what they are doing if they
did not have, at a minimum . . . a desire to keep the option open to develop
a nuclear weapon and perhaps even more so that they have already decided to
do that?"

Hayden continued to try to explain away the wide-spread public misperception
over the NIE by adding: "The other aspects of the Iranian nuclear effort,
beyond weaponization, the development of fissile materials, [and] the
development of delivery systems, all continue apace."

Hayden's boss, Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, also chimed
in, lamenting that the declassification of the NIE was done hastily and "If
I had to do it over again, I would be very specific in how I described what
was cancelled and what continued."

These recantations are all fine and good, but the damage in the court of
world opinion has been done. Our allies on this issue, especially in Europe,
see the unclassified publication of the NIE as extremely unhelpful in
advancing a case against Iran.

Unfortunately, all signals point to Iran having the seemingly undeniable
strategic intent of developing a nuclear weapons capability.

So why does it appear we may have gotten it wrong?

Several reasons come to mind. First, the public only saw the NIE's
unclassified key judgments, which may not have accurately reflected the
classified version of the 140-plus page report.

Second, Iran is a "tough target" for intelligence collection. Third, an NIE
is more like a photograph than a movie; it's based on what you know at a
specific moment in time. Fourth, written by human beings, NIEs are
vulnerable to individual biases.

But regardless, the fate of this country's security is tied to estimates
like these. Intelligence is our first line of defense in a dangerous world.
We must get it right for the benefit of both the public as well as the
policymakers.

Heritage Foundation senior fellow Peter Brookes is a former deputy assistant
secretary of defense. peterbrookes@heritage.org